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 2 
ABSTRACT 3 
What helps or limits the use of ecosystem services ideas in practice? This paper develops and 4 
tests a new institutionalist-based analytical scheme to explore how ecosystem services as a 5 
‘new’ policy idea might interact with established policy regimes, processes and norms.  The 6 
scheme is based on three different decision-making levels: micro, meso and macro. To test 7 
the plausibility of the scheme, it is applied to the case of the UK where a specific Ecosystem 8 
Services Framework (ESF) was prioritised as a new way of doing environmental policy after 9 
2011. Drawing on findings from 32 elite interviews, the paper shows how dynamics at all 10 
three levels intersect with differing institutional explanations. It helps explain important 11 
factors for embedding - or restricting embedding - of the ESF in policy-making. The scheme 12 
provides a useful way to link analysis of the ‘lived experience’ of policy actors implementing 13 
the ESF with the institutional landscape they occupy, and allows for a nuanced and integrated 14 
analysis of the potential barriers faced by ecosystem services ideas generally.  15 
 16 
 17 
INTRODUCTION 18 
Ideas to better capture the value of the natural environment in the form of ecosystem services 19 
(e.g. Costanza et al 2014; Rafaelli 2016) have a long history and a rich variety of disciplinary 20 
origins (**AUTHORS**). But the path from idea to policy is not always smooth. Studying 21 
the influence or lack thereof of particular ideas on policy processes, and factors that affect 22 
this influence, forms a large and growing area of literature in political studies (Schmidt 2008, 23 
Parsons 2016). Moreover, recent work in this journal (Noe et al 2017, Challenger et al 2018, 24 
Nordin et al 2017; Waylen et al 2015) and elsewhere (e.g. Jordan and Russel 2014; 25 
**AUTHORS**) has shown that embedding ideas about more ecologically sensitive policy 26 
making can be far from easy. The role institutions such as established policy regimes, 27 
processes and norms play in facilitating or blocking the influence of new ideas in policy 28 
processes is an old question. As Margaret Weir (1992) noted, institutions create opportunities 29 
for innovation but bound what types are possible.  This is particularly the case for 30 
environmental policy-making, replete with ideas about problems and solutions, cutting across 31 
multiple policy areas such as transport, water, energy and agriculture (Carter 2018).  Crudely, 32 
therefore, new environmental policy ideas such as ecosystem services often encounter ‘a lot 33 
of institution’ when attempts are made to use them to influence policy change. This paper 34 
develops an exploratory analytical scheme to understand the different institutions (Peters 35 
2016) that may confront ecosystem services ideas when attempts are made to better capture 36 
the value of the environment in policy decision making processes. To test the scheme, the 37 
paper applies it to the empirical case of the implementation of the United Kingdom’s 2011 38 
Natural Environment White Paper (Defra 2011). The paper's main aim is not to provide a 39 
definitive explanation of this case. Rather, it illustrates the utility of our scheme in drawing 40 
attention to different institutional processes that can be in play, and points to further areas of 41 
research to provide more detailed explanations. 42 
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There are several reasons for using the UK case. The White Paper drew on analysis within a 43 
government-sponsored National Ecosystem Assessment (NEA 2011), the UK being one of 44 
the first countries (Waylen and Young 2014) to conduct such an assessment. The White 45 
Paper aimed at a major change in how environmental goals were delivered through policy 46 
making. At its core were a reduced focus on direct regulation, while better capturing 47 
environmental value (both monetary and non-monetary) to society through an Ecosystem 48 
Services Framework (ESF) based around a more integrated approach to environmental 49 
management. In this context, the ESF aimed at better understanding of “the processes that 50 
link human societies and their wellbeing with the environment” (NEA 2011: 15). The White 51 
Paper said “[ministries] will be open about the steps they are taking to address biodiversity 52 
and the needs of the natural environment, including actions to:  promote, conserve and 53 
enhance biodiversity; and reduce the environmental impacts of food and catering services.’ 54 
(Defra 2011 p. 43).  55 
One might imagine such a policy idea that was well-established conceptually and had 56 
emerged from well-respected scholarship (MEA 2005, NEA 2011), and was given a clear 57 
national policy steer, would be implemented in a widespread fashion. But the embedding of 58 
the ESF required ministries to adopt new institutional processes and practices to better 59 
capture ecological value in their activities, through, for example, data collection, ex ante 60 
appraisal of policies and evaluation mechanisms (see for instance **AUTHORS**). And the 61 
ESF, while relatively simple in its basic concept, has been shown to have multiple different 62 
ideas attached to it in both theoretical debates and policy practice (**AUTHORS**). It has 63 
also been repeatedly argued that the UK has fallen short of its ambitious environmental 64 
policy goals, due in part to institutional constraints (Russel and Jordan 2008).  In sum, we 65 
suggest the great expectations around the White Paper were particularly likely to encounter a 66 
wide range of institutional challenges. Given the above, rather than choosing a definition of 67 
ESF a priori, we focus on the term as it was actually used, and explore the various 68 
interpretations through ‘lived experience’ of what ESF is in different institutional contexts as 69 
part of the empirical research.  This allows for multiple interpretations and reasons for (not) 70 
embedding or using the ESF as it was differently understood. 71 
 72 
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section draws on literature on ideas and institutions 73 
to introduce our micro-meso-macro analytical scheme, and shows how this incorporates 74 
analysis of different strands of institutionalism as an empirical question. The following 75 
section discusses our methods and the section after that presents our empirical findings on the 76 
embedding of the ESF in UK policy making in relation to our analytical scheme. The final 77 
section discusses the implications of our findings, and proposes an extended scheme for using 78 
institutional analysis to understand how environmental ideas are embedded in policy making. 79 
 80 
IDEA-INSTITUTION RELATIONSHIPS: AN ANALYTICAL SCHEME 81 
Institutions are critical for embedding new policy ideas and associated processes and practice 82 
(Béland 2005, 2009, Kern 2011, Oliver and Pemberton 2004, Peters 2016). We follow 83 
Scharpf’s (1997: 38) definition of institutions as ‘systems of rules, norms and cultural 84 
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systems of meaning that shape the courses of action’. Crucially, as Béland (2009) observes, 85 
institutions define 'rules of the game' and associated political opportunity structures. As such, 86 
institutions can constrain and create opportunities depending on how ideas fit with existing 87 
institutional rules (Kern 2011), and challenge powerful actors (Béland 2009).   88 
 89 
Various strands of institutionalism have emerged in the past three decades offering different 90 
explanatory perspectives (Peters 2016). In this paper, we draw on three commonly-used 91 
strands (Hall and Taylor 1996; Peters 2016) in which decision-making logics emerge through 92 
institutional processes that shape values which in turn lead to the creation of norms: the 93 
development of set behaviour-based practices and actions and attitudes towards those 94 
practices.. However, each strand has a different rationale in terms of what drives the logics.  95 
A rational choice institutionalist explanation is based on actors behaving, according to their 96 
(given) preferences, to optimize utility within the constraints established by institutions. 97 
Institutions here are purposefully constructed to ensure a collectively rational outcome that 98 
would not materialize if everybody acted individually on their preferences ( a ‘logic of 99 
consequence’) (Peters 2016). By contrast, a sociological institutionalist explanation is based 100 
on collective decision-making driven by “what one can imagine oneself doing” (Hall & 101 
Taylor 1996: 948; Peters 2016) in particular contexts.  The institutions here are values-based 102 
routinised norms that dictate decision rules, and frames of meaning.  In this ‘logic of 103 
appropriateness’, actors behave, through a process of socialisation, according to the 104 
surrounding institutions.  Agency is lower than in a rational choice explanation - but not zero 105 
as institutions are still actively created and refined, although not necessarily with the same 106 
degree of preference-satisfying purpose. Third, a historical institutionalist explanation is 107 
based on the ‘logic of path dependency’: outcomes are dependent on the structural history of 108 
decision-making (Peters 2016). Institutions are said to be ‘sticky’ and hard to change because 109 
of embedded power relationships, political authority and the weight of past decisions. Actors 110 
are therefore argued to be objects and agents of history meaning that agency is lower still 111 
than in a sociological explanation. More recently, different approaches have opened up 112 
(Lowndes and Roberts 2013).  In place of various institutionalist strands offering competing 113 
explanations, the strands are more often used to illuminate different elements of common 114 
themes, such as rules, practices and narratives (Lowndes and Roberts 2013) that cross all 115 
strands.  In this approach, "the character of constraint...is an empirical rather than an 116 
ontological matter" (Lowndes and Roberts 2013: 76): "As actors encounter institutions ... 117 
they are likely to be motivated by (some combination of) their selfish interests, their 'need to 118 
belong', and their underlying ideas and values" (Lowndes 2018: 71).  119 
 120 
In this spirit, this paper builds on the work of (*AUTHORS*), following an inductive 121 
exploratory approach to examine how institutional dynamics operating at three different 122 
decision-making levels embody different strands of institutionalism, and are thus crucial to 123 
influencing how the ESF is embedded in policy-making. The micro level is concerned with 124 
the individual behaviour of policy makers who have to engage with the ESF: their behaviour 125 
and the resource constraints (e.g. expertise, professional background, timescale, awareness, 126 
understanding) that bear upon them. As Berman (1998, cited in Oliver and Pemberton 2004) 127 
notes, ideas need transmitters, individuals or groups, to promote the idea, influence behaviour 128 
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and build coalitions – also see Béland (2005). However, institutions place constraints on the 129 
actions (Torfing 2001) of individual actors in policy making because of the informal and 130 
formal policy making rules often operating at a higher ‘meso’ level. The meso level is 131 
concerned with organisational dynamics, including organisational procedures and 132 
management structures, systems of knowledge transfer, norms and incentive structures and 133 
inter-organization competition.  Behaviour is driven by formal and informal policy making 134 
rules, and goals of policy making organisations.  Among other things, rules make it possible 135 
to coordinate simultaneous activities, avoid conflict and help to mitigate against 136 
unpredictability (March and Olsen 1989: 24), and to reduce “the time and energy otherwise 137 
used on thousands of decisions about how to perceive and evaluate an otherwise 138 
unintelligible stream of information" (March and Olsen 1994: 253). While, over time or in 139 
times of acute crisis, these rules and routines can change, it is said that they tend to have a 140 
“surprising durability” (March and Olsen 1994: 262), which gives the impression of inertia 141 
(Smith et al. 2000). The macro level is concerned with the wider political, economic and 142 
social context, including dominant values, norms and goals Institutional organisation of the 143 
polity, society and the economy structures behaviour, and promotes certain values and ideas 144 
over others (Hall and Taylor 1996, Weir and Skocpol 1985).    145 
 146 
The levels clearly interact; there is no assumption that the ‘macro’ level provides the 147 
overarching societal and political structure within which decisions at other levels are taken.  148 
And each level may contain evidence of differing institutionalist explanations.  The ways that 149 
institutional explanations and different levels interact with, and shape, each other in the 150 
attempts to embed the ESF in UK policy-making is an empirical question addressed in the 151 
rest of this paper. Our claim is the three levels approach provides a relatively simple way to 152 
obtain empirical information because levels are intuitively familiar to policy actors, the ways 153 
they work and the structures they work within.  Moreover, we seek to probe the plausibility  154 
(Eckstein 1975) of the levels approach as a way to link analysis of the ‘lived experience’ of 155 
policy actors trying to embed the ESF in their own words with different potential institutional 156 
explanations embedded therein. 157 
 158 
METHODS 159 
This paper employs the ‘elite interview’ method (Richards, 1996) and draws on 32 interviews 160 
with a range of experts within the UK in 2013/14.  This was the period immediately 161 
following the Natural Environment White Paper and National Ecosystem Assessment: a 162 
period which might be expected to have high recognition and traction of the ESF as an idea, 163 
but where existing institutions seem to have experienced significant challenges (* REF TO 164 
AUTHORS* ). The period was a time of flux, and idea-institution dynamics might be 165 
expected to be most interesting. In this context, it was important to explore how the 166 
interviewees interpreted the ESF and its required integrating into decision making. To ensure 167 
a range of perspectives was captured, a classification of policy advisors was used to select 168 
interviewees. Howlett (2011: 33), synthesising literature on policy advisors and advice 169 
systems, proposed two dimensions as being particularly important in classifying policy 170 
advisors: "their location inside or outside of government, and ... how closely they operate to 171 
decision-makers". Combining these dimensions results in four 'communities' of policy 172 
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advisors. These were adopted in this paper: ‘Core Actors’ such as government officials and 173 
policy analysts (labelled as interviewees A1 to A15 in the empirical sections below); ‘Public 174 
Sector Insiders’ such as commissions, task forces, Research Councils, advisory bodies 175 
(labelled B1 to B6); ‘Non-governmental Insiders’ such as consultants carrying out policy 176 
appraisals (C1 to C4); ‘Outsiders’ (e.g. businesses, trade associations, Third Sector 177 
Organisations, independent academics, think tanks: D1 to D7). Interviews followed a semi- 178 
structured format around several headline questions (see Appendix 1) to allow for both 179 
comparability and flexibility (see Bryman 2016). These questions were broad enough to test 180 
points raised in the literature, while simultaneously avoiding steering or leading the 181 
interviewees. The conversations were led by each interviewee’s experiences and knowledge. 182 
The interviews were conducted either face-to-face or via telephone. Interview summary 183 
transcripts were produced shortly after each interview.    184 
 185 
Analysis of the data was guided by the questions asked in the semi-structured interviews 186 
which built upon the research questions and  analytical scheme. Following the interviews, the 187 
data underwent thematic analysis, a technique widely used in the qualitative social sciences 188 
(Nowell et al 2017) for “identifying, analyzing, organizing, describing, and reporting themes 189 
found within a data set (Braun & Clarke, 2006)” (Nowell et al 2007, p.2). Thematic analysis 190 
is especially useful for ensuring the researcher follows a consistent and well-structured 191 
strategy for sorting qualitative data (King 2004). Following established approaches (e.g. see 192 
Nowell et al) both authors: 1) read and became very familiar with our interview transcripts 193 
and re-checked against the original recordings; 2) established an initial set of meta codes 194 
based on step one to guide step three. Broad themes were identified around barriers and 195 
enablers to embedding, including aspects such as valuation, bureaucratic burden, and 196 
resources; 3) revisited the themes in the data for a more fine-grained analysis so that sub-197 
themes emerged. For example the broad theme of valuation contained subthemes including 198 
individual concerns about the ethics of valuing nature, social resistance to valuing nature,  199 
and concerns about the accuracy of environment value data; 4) finalised the themes and 200 
checked all data assigned to themes for consistency; 5) documented the themes in relation to 201 
the research questions and analytical scheme, drawing on the detailed theoretical foundations 202 
(see above) to guide us to where the different themes fit. All stages were conducted by two 203 
researchers independently to check for consistency. Consistency and reliability were also 204 
aided by the use of our interview selection strategy where respondents with different 205 
relationships to the ESF and the policy processes could be triangulated (Bryman 2016) within 206 
the identified themes to see where perspectives were similar or differed depending on 207 
different affiliations (see also Nowell et al 2017). 208 
   209 
 210 
 211 
RESULTS 212 
This section outlines our findings, which reveal how institutional dynamics operating at the 213 
different levels each display different strands of institutionalism. 214 
 215 
Micro level 216 
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From our data, two main findings emerged at the micro level. First, it did not necessarily 217 
benefit an individual to understand or be aware of a new idea. Interviewees1 talked about the 218 
difficulties they faced in getting colleagues to fully understand the ESF and relate it to their 219 
work. For example one interviewee remarked: 220 
 221 
“People internally find [the ESF] difficult to grasp. It is the current sexy term but people 222 
struggle to understand what it means.” [Interviewee, A3] 223 
 224 
Five2 interviewees also spoke of low awareness of the issue in general amongst colleagues.   225 
Both the issues of understanding and low awareness may have been a product of the technical 226 
nature of the ESF, but, under a rational logic, struggling with the concept might in some cases 227 
have been a deliberate tactic. Choosing not to understand, to avoid having to address the 228 
issues ESF raises around valuing nature3 and consequent burden or threat, demonstrated a 229 
strong degree of agency. There is evidence that hierarchical imposition of an idea could have 230 
been resented as extra work, with a resulting barely minimal compliance:  231 
 232 
 “Sticks tend to result in tick boxes.”  [interviewee, A2] 233 
 234 
The added value of the ESF was also questioned even by individuals working in the natural 235 
environment sector. Three interviewees4 suggested this may be because the ESF represented 236 
a threat to professional expertise, and by implication jobs, particularly in the environment 237 
sector. Another clue to why ESF may have been seen as a threat comes from a more 238 
sociological institutionalist perspective.  How was the new idea congruent with a norm of 239 
expected behaviour by policy makers, or by those employing them?  For example, one 240 
interviewee expressed scepticism about the chance of embedding ESF in existing policy 241 
making processes, as ESF was regarded purely as “economics in some people’s minds” 242 
[A13].  In a similar vein, four5 interviewees thought that the ESF was mainly an exercise in 243 
quantification– and thus: 244 
 245 
“... people resist it because they think it is just about monetising bio-diversity which runs 246 
against their core values” [B2] 247 
 248 
It is not clear from the data whether this interpretation of the ESF was deliberate or not. This 249 
distinction might be important because it implies different logics at play, namely a more 250 
rational one for a deliberate misinterpretation of the concept, and a more sociological one 251 
where established processes for interpreting new knowledge shape how that knowledge is 252 
understood.  253 
 254 
                                                 
1 Interviewees: A3, A4, A15, B2, C1, C2, C3, C4, D3, D5, D7 
2 A11, A12, A13, A15, B4 
3 A2, B1 
4 A5, B1, C2 
5 B2, C3, C4, D2 
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Points raised by some respondents6 about a lack of suitable data for handling the ESF might 255 
indicate a similar issue: policy makers were expected to draw on unfamiliar concepts, made 256 
more difficult by lack of complete supporting information.  An uncomfortable expectation of 257 
being able to handle this could have led to a lack of engagement. 258 
 259 
The second main finding at the micro level was the emerging resource gap for addressing the 260 
new idea of ESF. Several respondents7 spoke of an individual skills gap for dealing with the 261 
type of analysis that the ESF entails.  A rational institutionalist perspective might question the 262 
extent to which it benefitted organisations to rearrange their skills profiles in response to a 263 
new idea, before checking carefully that this would continue to benefit the organisation. A 264 
historical institutionalist explanation is also pertinent: another five interviewees8 observed 265 
that because the established structure of UK government tended to compartmentalise skills 266 
across all levels of government, experts had limited opportunity to work together on ESF-267 
related matters. As one respondent put it: 268 
 269 
“At the moment skills are siloed, meaning for example that an economist working on one 270 
place may not be properly linked-up with an ecologist working on the same place at the 271 
moment. So, we need to integrate section skills.” [A4]  272 
 273 
Meso level 274 
Several findings emerged at the meso level. First, the role of timing. The applicability of the 275 
ESF to existing decision-making timescales was questioned by some interviewees9 in two 276 
senses: administrative timescale differences, and differences between shorter-term electoral-277 
cycle driven concerns (often based around economics) and longer time frames of 278 
environmental protection. Overcoming historically-established ways of handling timescales 279 
was crucial10.  One perspective was that change simply takes time11: 280 
 281 
“There has been 25 years of culture of doing these things the way they are…, so to turn the 282 
ship around might take some time.” [D2] 283 
 284 
Second, departmental resistance, ambivalence or boundary-drawing was seen as a key issue 285 
for diffusion of the ESF into non-environment departments whose work had an impact on 286 
ecosystems quality12. A strong drawing of boundaries was seen by one interviewee as a 287 
rational response to avoiding being overwhelmed with extra work: 288 
 289 
“This is interesting stuff, but there is no evidence of its value to us” [A2] 290 
                                                 
6 A3, A4, A7, B2, B3, B4, B5, C3, C4, D2, D3 
7 A1, A3, A15, B2, C1, C2, C3, D3 
8 A4, A12, C2, C3, D2 
9 A4, A8, A15, B1, B2, B3, C1, C3, D3, D5, D7 
10 B2 
11 B2, D4 
12 A2, A5, A11, B4, C1, D6 
8 
 
 291 
or by another to the diluting of one's own ministry with another's agenda:  292 
 293 
“Although the [Environment] White Paper is a Government Document, it is clearly perceived 294 
by other departments as [the Environment Ministry’s] White Paper. It’s not got the other 295 
government departments interested. They still see it as the [Environment Ministry’s] or the 296 
environment sector’s agenda so they are not joining up policy for the holistic view present in 297 
the White Paper. This makes implementing it not very easy.” [B4] 298 
 299 
Scepticism of the utility of helping another department achieve its policy goals would not be 300 
unexpected from a rational institutionalist perspective. The cross-cutting nature of the ESF as 301 
outlined in the 2011 Natural Environment White Paper meant that its implementation would 302 
use resources from different ministries, to the detriment of achieving their own core goals, 303 
while the environment ministry’s utility would be enhanced by passing the responsibility for 304 
action on to others. 305 
 306 
Third, and similar to the micro level, the ESF was seen as a burden and distraction for the 307 
organisation as a whole, and therefore rationally treated similarly to the way an individual 308 
policy maker might: as a tick-box exercise rather than an opportunity to approach policy 309 
making in a different way13.  But a sociological institutional perspective can help interpret 310 
fourteen14 interviewees' point that the ESF was not particularly congruent with the 311 
organisation's decision-making norms, expressed by querying the ESF's applicability to 312 
various decision-making situations and project areas even in the environmental sector.  Such 313 
situations included, for example, simple amendments to policy or in situations where EU 314 
policy had to be transposed.  315 
 316 
“You start to run into existing practices and ways of doing things. If you are actually doing 317 
nothing it is easier to bring in the ESF. But where you already have existing approaches you 318 
get adaptation rather than significant change.” [B2] 319 
 320 
In this sense, interviewees spoke of existing policies which did not reflect the joined-up more 321 
flexible nature of the ESF, such as national (and European) policies and approaches that 322 
promoted the in-situ regulation of the management of sites of special scientific interest or 323 
nature reserves rather than an integrated more adaptable way of ecological management. In a 324 
similar vein, the European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy was not geared towards the 325 
ESF, being more concerned with environmental protection and production through farmer 326 
support. 327 
 328 
We also observed incongruence between ESF and organisations' decision-making norms 329 
related to a lack of sustained leadership from ministers, senior civil servants, executive 330 
                                                 
13 A14, B3 
14 A1, A3, A4, A8, A11, A12, A14, A15, B3, B4, B5, C1, C2, D3 
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officers and central government departments15. Indeed, one interviewee noted open hostility 331 
amongst management in his institution: 332 
 333 
“The high command tried to sabotage the ESF as it runs against the reductionist and 334 
managerialist culture of [my institution]. The ecosystems [framework] is thus seen as 335 
inconvenient. So they make the appearance of implementing the ESF, but in reality they may 336 
or may not be.” [B1] 337 
 338 
Fourth, the match (or not) of the new idea with existing processes was important. Three 339 
particular types of mismatch were evident: of the concept, of structures and of terminology. 340 
Many interviewees16 were negative about the concept of the ESF, mainly on the basis of the 341 
rational critique of whether it really added value to existing policy making processes. Some 342 
interviewees17 for instance wondered whether the ESF was something (i.e. greater 343 
environmental protection) that had been attempted (albeit in different guises such as 344 
sustainable development) many times before, suggesting a form of historical path-345 
dependency. For one (Interviewee A6) it was seen as an empty ‘buzzword’. Others 346 
questioned whether employing an ESF led to better decisions, or whether it added anything to 347 
what they were doing already. For example, one commented: 348 
 349 
“The common question is invariably, ‘what is it that we should be doing different 350 
internally?’” [B2] 351 
 352 
While interviewees questioned the utility of the ESF, it was noted by some respondents that 353 
regardless of the concept’s utility: “[the environment ministry] has spent a great deal of 354 
money in promoting [the ESF] and so they have to have a practical outcome.” [C1], giving 355 
evidence of maximizing returns from sunk costs.   356 
 357 
The mismatch of structures formed another significant challenge: whether the ESF was 358 
compatible or not with historically-entrenched institutional arrangements. In some cases, this 359 
was framed as a structural problem in terms of institutional fragmentation and the existence 360 
of silos: 361 
 362 
“… the planning system doesn’t address agriculture and forestry. These are not covered by 363 
planning and are the responsibility of a different department” [C1] 364 
 365 
Fragmented institutional arrangements have a history and thus traction; the consequence of 366 
this, according to interviewees18, was that policy was often not joined up which could impede 367 
the ESF as an idea. Crucially there were a lack of institutional platforms for discussing the 368 
                                                 
15 A4, A2, B1, B4, D4 
16 A6, A10, A14, A15, C1, C2, C3, D4, D7 
17 A5, A7, A14, B2, B3, C2, D6 
18 A5, A14, C1, D3 
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management of ecosystems limiting the opportunity of learning across institutional silos 369 
(interviewee C2).  370 
 371 
Finally, a mismatch of terminology between the ESF and the more practical context of policy 372 
making was raised19. For instance, one interviewee remarked: 373 
 374 
“...at the moment, the concept is so nebulous there is a danger that it won’t be meaningful.... 375 
If I have 10 experts in a room, I will currently get 10 different approaches.” [C2].  376 
 377 
The issue of language was compounded by a lack of clear terminology20, with weakly-378 
defined concepts like shared social values, natural capital, environmental valuation and 379 
various related terms such as the ‘ecosystems approach’, tended to muddy the waters and 380 
create ambiguous targets for policy makers. This meant that for these interviewees there was 381 
a lot of confusion over what the implementation of the ESF in a specific context entailed. For 382 
example, did they have to establish and appraise environmental values, did they have to 383 
produce a natural capital stock take, did they need have a more joined up approach to 384 
ecosystem management? Some interviewees suggested that academics should more simply 385 
and better define their concepts, for example: 386 
 387 
“...we operate in an academic world, so there is a lot of jargon of language and terms 388 
surrounding the [ESF]. As things develop, we need to be less worried about the specifics of 389 
jargon. Even if we are not quite talking in the same terms, are we pushing in the same 390 
direction?” [A2]   391 
 392 
Thus, we saw conflicting understandings between academics and policy makers, operating 393 
within different contexts and expectations of their profession groups, of the appropriate 394 
conceptualizations of the ESF.  395 
 396 
Macro level 397 
Similar to both micro and macro levels was the sense of burden or threat emerging from a 398 
new idea at the macro level. Speaking to a more rational logic, the role of political steering 399 
was observed by five of our respondents21, which they argued affected the embedding of the 400 
ESF. Politicians responding to public pressures, party politics, manifesto commitments and 401 
crises pushed for their preferred policy outcome. In such situations embedding the ESF into 402 
policy was seen by some to have been heavy-handed or indeed superfluous.22 In these cases, 403 
one interviewee (B1) argued that such pressures meant that the ESF was seen as a threat for 404 
overtly rationalist political reasons, which led to resistance. This could manifest itself through 405 
a desire to appear to implement while not actually doing so, using the requirement for, for 406 
example, proportionality in policy making as an excuse to keep the new idea away. 407 
                                                 
19 A4, A12, C2, C3, D2 
20 A4, A8, A14, C1, C2, C3, C4, D3, D7 
21 A6, A8, A11, A12, D3 
22 A11, A12 
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 408 
Our findings showed that broader political priorities during the period studied tended to 409 
concentrate on economic issues such as austerity in public spending, and reducing the 410 
regulatory burden23, to reduce costs and impacts of policy on business and society. These 411 
high-profile macro-level policy discourses and strategy undermined efforts to mainstream the 412 
ESF in policy making. For instance, according to one interviewee (A5), new procedures or 413 
regulations may have contradicted broader political priorities. As another interviewee’s 414 
rationalist interpretation of this problem argued: “[the government is keen to] not let 415 
environmental regulation get in the way of infrastructure development and housing” [B4]. 416 
This trend was argued by three respondents24 to have worsened during the environment of 417 
austerity, which placed further pressure on resources. 418 
 419 
Our findings also revealed a more sociological institutional element to why the ESF may 420 
have been seen as an inappropriate way to frame environmental problems, thus hampering its 421 
traction in policy-making. Environmentally-sympathetic people may be put off by the 422 
perceived economic framing and question the underlying ethics of valuing nature in monetary 423 
terms, arguing that nature has a right to exist or be valued beyond its services to humans 25. 424 
Moreover, to some respondents the whole notion of the ESF contrasted with broader values 425 
of society, which generally prioritised factors other than ecosystems such as wealth creation, 426 
health, job security, and car-friendly transport policy26. 427 
 428 
 429 
DISCUSSION 430 
In this paper we sought to build upon the literature on the difficulties faced when embedding 431 
ideas to better capture the value of the natural environment into policy. We have examined 432 
the role of institutional dynamics, in the form of established policy regimes, processes and 433 
norms. The paper used a case - embedding the ESF in the UK in the period immediately 434 
following the 2011 Natural Environment White Paper - as a plausibility probe (Eckstein 435 
1975) for an analytical scheme based on different institutional levels - individual behaviour 436 
(micro), organisational dynamics (meso) and wider social and political context (macro). In 437 
the remainder of this section we first discuss how activity at all three levels intersected with 438 
differing institutional explanations for the embedding (or not) of the ESF idea in established 439 
policy processes. We then use this to propose a more detailed expansion of the analytical 440 
scheme. 441 
 442 
Micro-level institutional dynamics  443 
Institutions offer incentives and disincentives for certain types of individuals' interventions 444 
and behaviours, for example how far dealing with the issues associated with policy ideas can 445 
help achieve formal goals and positive career progression for policy officials (Hall and 446 
                                                 
23 A2, A6, A12, B3, B4, B5, C1, D1, D2, D3, D5, D6 
24 A14, B2, D2 
25 B3, D5 
26 A4, A6, A8, B1, B2, B4, B5, C1, D3 
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Taylor 1996). In relation to this aspect, we found low awareness of the ESF concept despite 447 
some strong signalling by the core executive, suggesting that the concept was a long way 448 
from helping policy makers achieve formal goals. Moreover, institutional prioritisation 449 
shapes how much human and time resources are available to policy makers to collect suitable 450 
data related to the policy idea, and to integrate this data into their policy making (Turnpenny 451 
et al 2008, Russel and Jordan 2009). From our data it appeared that actions at a micro level 452 
were bounded by individuals' low understanding of the concept, and/or deliberate subversion, 453 
in some cases intentionally choosing not to understand the concept of the ESF as a 454 
professional or organisational threat. It appeared that individual action may be bound by 455 
‘congealed preferences’ relating to rational logics of consequence where decisions are framed 456 
around achieving rational instrumental goals and efforts to reduce transaction costs of action 457 
(Torfing 2001). Sociologically constructed ‘logics of appropriateness’, through which 458 
images, symbols and rituals combine to form rules of behaviour which can lead to the 459 
development of shared meaning (Morgan, 1997: 132) or to “webs of meaning” (Marsh, et al., 460 
2001: 21), were also revealed at the micro level. These included some of the expected norms 461 
of policy makers which led them to reject (or embrace) the economic analysis elements of the 462 
ESF, on the basis of their professional identity (Torfing 2001) and beliefs (Hall and Taylor, 463 
1996). Another factor that can bound action is the supply of information to decision makers 464 
(Hall and Taylor, 1996, Torfing 2001). As our data imply, information asymmetries and data 465 
gaps made it difficult for policy makers to understand the impacts of a policy idea in their 466 
sector and the relevance to the policy at hand (**AUTHORS**). In relation to this point and 467 
our data, a ‘logic of appropriateness’ may also help explain the observed perceived lack of 468 
suitable data: the economic data available on the value of the environment was in conflict 469 
with resistance to 'pricing the environment'. Moreover, individual policy makers have a 470 
bounded cognitive capacity and are only capable of processing and interpreting a given 471 
amount of data (Béland 2005, Simon 1985). The ability to focus on a few core issues at once 472 
may account for the observed low awareness and ambivalence within our data. Overall, if an 473 
issue raised by a new policy idea is not seen as core to an official’s job, it can easily be 474 
ignored.  475 
 476 
Meso-level institutional dynamics  477 
Rules for handling and embedding new policy ideas at the meso-level may develop for a 478 
number of reasons: from a logic of consequence structuring interactions to stop free-riding 479 
and pursue organisational goals, from a logic of appropriateness in which webs of meaning 480 
shape the rules through which networks and collectives of policy-making actors interpret 481 
policy ideas (Hall and Taylor, 1996), and/or from a logic of path dependency. In this latter 482 
historical institutionalist perspective, rules are structured around past policy decisions and 483 
practices, creating path dependency and institutional stickiness. Institutional rules act as 484 
external constraints that define the repertoire not the choice of action (Torfing 2001: 286) and 485 
as such structure the range and sequence of alternative actions when confronting policy 486 
making (Hall and Taylor 1996).  487 
 488 
All manifest in our data. There was a mismatch between the structured decision-making 489 
timescales and the longer timeframes associated with the ESF. Moreover, rules can structure 490 
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what is considered a legitimate course of action (Torfing 2001), or legitimate evidence to 491 
support action (Juntti et al 2009). Within the data, the observation that ESF was the 492 
Environment Ministry’s agenda seemingly provoked a rationalist reaction undermining the 493 
ESF’s legitimacy, viewing it instead as a threat by other ministries. We observed a 494 
questioning of the utility of the ESF, and whether it really represented something different. 495 
Rules either allow space (rule in) or crowd out (rule out) certain ideas, depending on how the 496 
issue fits with established practice (Russel and Jordan 2009, Torfing 2001). Rules also shape 497 
the relations and interactions of the sub-units of an organisation, which may have a set of 498 
complementary but also different and conflicting rules (Richards and Smith 2002). This 499 
pattern was manifest for example in the observed mismatch between the ESF and other 500 
organisational norms; the ESF was observed to run against established practice. There was 501 
similarly an observed mismatch between ESF and historical institutional structures, which 502 
made embedding ESF in important departments (even within the environment ministry) 503 
difficult.  In such situations where rules conflict between sub-units, departmental pluralism or 504 
departmentalism (Russel and Jordan 2009) can develop where the cross-cutting initiative or 505 
idea enthusiastically taken up in one part of the organisation does not fit with the rules of 506 
another, leading in some cases to conflict and active resistance, over the questioning of the 507 
added value of the approach. The data also showed that sociologically constructed webs of 508 
meaning created different understandings of both the problem the ESF attempted to address 509 
and the proposed solutions to said problems, between different institutions of science and 510 
between the institutions of science and policy making (also see *AUTHORS*).   511 
 512 
Macro-level institutional dynamics 513 
Power asymmetries, allowing some groups disproportionate access to policy making over 514 
others (Hall and Taylor 1996), can lead to the creation of constraints and opportunities for 515 
embedding new ideas (Béland 2005), as the historical sequence of decisions structure 516 
political debate and related dominant paradigms and values in society (Béland 2005). In such 517 
situations, problems can arise with the embedding of new ideas into policy making if that 518 
issue is too far from a dominant policy paradigm. As Niemelä and Saarinen (2012) note, this 519 
maintenance of the dominant norms is akin to the production of cognitive locks, so rather 520 
than a change in policy making approach, policies and existing institutions are reproduced 521 
over time. Thus there is a risk of path dependency (Hall and Taylor 1996), whereby new 522 
policy ideas are rejected to reduce the risk of instability at the macro level. Here we see in our 523 
data the perception that the ESF was a threat from a rational institutionalist perspective. In 524 
this understanding, utility-maximising politicians responded to public and interest group 525 
pressures for reduced policy 'burden', especially in times of economic difficulty as in this case 526 
study. Thus, the ESF was employed in an attempt to appease environmental interests, but not 527 
in a way that was disruptive to traditional policy concerns around the economy. New ideas 528 
can also contradict entrenched societal norms about what is an important or appropriate 529 
subject to consider.  In such circumstances, even if change is initiated it is marginal as the 530 
‘new ideas’ are built upon pre-existing political, societal and economic paradigms that 531 
dominate a sector and/or wider society (Niemelä and Saarinen, 2012, Torfing 2001: 297).  532 
Again, we can see examples of this in our data, including on the one hand wariness of valuing 533 
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nature in the environmental sector, and on the other an explicit prioritising of non-534 
environmental issues among wider societal groups in the period studied.  535 
 536 
Developing and using the analytical scheme 537 
The levels-based analytical scheme, for the case studied,  has helped link analysis of the 538 
‘lived experience’ of policy actors working with the ESF in their own words with different 539 
potential institutional explanations embedded therein, adding layers of nuance, as well as 540 
offering a practical approach to empirical enquiry. It seems to confirm the claim that "each 541 
[of the strands of NI] seems to be providing a partial account of the forces at work in a given 542 
situation” (Hall and Taylor 1996: 955). In so doing, the scheme does not imply that one 543 
institutional logic is at play more than the other, or at specific levels. Rather, it combines 544 
related but different institutional perspectives to explore the types of responses that a new 545 
environmental policy idea might encounter. 546 
 547 
How might the scheme be used in other cases? Table 1 summarises the kinds of responses 548 
that might be encountered when listening to policy actors' views about a new environmental 549 
policy idea, across the nine intersections between institutional logics and levels. 550 
 551 
Table 1: What might we hear when a new idea confronts existing institutions? 552 
Institutional 
logic 
Micro level:  
individual 
behaviour 
Meso level: 
organisational 
dynamics 
Macro level:  
wider social & political 
context 
Rational CELL 1: "How far 
does Idea X help me 
as an individual?" 
CELL 2: "how far does 
Idea X help our 
organisation / unit / 
team protect core 
resources / influence / 
budget?"  
CELL 3: "How far does 
Idea X help meet wider 
political and societal 
preferences?"  
Historical 
 
CELL 4: "How 
familiar am I with 
Idea X?" 
CELL 5: "How does 
Idea X challenge 
established decision-
making roles and 
competencies?" 
CELL 6: "How does Idea X 
challenge established 
societal structures, ideas and 
power relations?" 
Sociological 
 
 
CELL 7: "How far 
is Idea X consistent 
with what is 
expected of me?" 
CELL 8: "How far is 
Idea X consistent with 
how we make decisions 
in our organisation / 
unit / team?" 
CELL 9: "How far is Idea 
X consistent with wider 
social norms?" 
 553 
At the micro level, if the answer to the question in Cell 1 is ‘no’, idea X may be seen as a 554 
burden or a threat, and likely to be resisted by the individual.  Idea X is also likely to be 555 
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resisted if the individual policy actor is unfamiliar with it (Cell 4).  In Cell 7, expectations on 556 
the individual may come from a variety of sources - colleagues, management, social norms - 557 
but to overcome barriers to embedding, idea X should fit with policy makers' expectations of 558 
what is appropriate activity.  At the meso level, in Cell 2, the implication is the organisation, 559 
unit or team will check to see if they can still maximise their utility in the face of idea X.  In 560 
Cell 5, the source of the entrenchment can come as a result of exercise of power ("we'll tread 561 
on other departments' toes") or of simple repetition ("this isn't our job, it's Ministry A's").  562 
The implications are that idea X could either fit with entrenched decision-making structures, 563 
challenge these in a way that leads to resistance, or challenge these at critical junctures and 564 
enable embedding of the idea.  In Cell 8, idea X is more likely to be embedded if it fits with 565 
organisational decision-making norms, such as how evidence is collected, when evidence is 566 
collected,  what type of evidence to collect, different approaches and timings in relation to 567 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders involvement, etc. At the macro level, in 568 
Cell 3, ideas that contradict socio-political preferences would be a threat to utility.  In Cell 6, 569 
as in Cell 5, an idea’s degree of fit with entrenched decision-making structures would 570 
influence the embedding of the idea.  In Cell 9, idea X is likely to need to fit with social 571 
norms to become embedded.  572 
 573 
The scheme we propose does not necessarily resolve how both the dynamics at the 574 
institutional levels and the drivers of these dynamics interact.  There is clearly interaction 575 
between the levels. For example, individual responses to the idea are determined/shaped by 576 
meso-level organization dynamics and these are in turn shaped by wider social preferences 577 
and values such as whether or not to monetise the natural environment.  Interactions also 578 
occur in different directions; for instance, a lack of resources / expertise (micro) can influence 579 
how far an organisation sees an idea as a concept worth taking seriously (meso). Individual 580 
responses are also shaped by an individual's 'position' within one of the four distinct 581 
communities of policy advisors, whether they identify with more than one community, and 582 
how well-established their position and influence is. More directly, such positioning may also 583 
influence the views gathered and reported in this paper. Points made above by a wide range 584 
of 'types' of interviewee may be seen as less likely to reflect an individual's own 585 
circumstances.    586 
 587 
Moreover, the explanations embedded within the different strands of institutionalism will 588 
interact in a manner which requires further exploration. For instance, the extent to which 589 
policy processes stem from the rational management of complexity in the policy sphere, a 590 
logic of appropriateness, or historical legacy is not a question our scheme can necessarily 591 
resolve on its own. The scheme's usefulness rather lies in revealing different factors present 592 
in any chosen case as a way to direct subsequent more explanatory research. Exploring first 593 
which 'cells' in Table 1 are present and to what degree can guide development of more 594 
detailed research questions around, for example, which institutionalist explanation is most 595 
strongly at play in a given case. In this way, our scheme is more research-question-generating 596 
than question-answering.   597 
 598 
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Which interesting cases might be examined in such a way? While this paper showed a limited 599 
uptake of the ESF and many institutional constraints in the period studied, there has since 600 
been significant presence of the ideas behind the ESF in national and local policy in the UK 601 
which shows that despite the difficulties of embedding the ESF, the idea still has traction.  602 
For example, initiatives have included the creation of Nature Improvement Areas in 2016, 603 
which seek to create joined up and resilient ecological networks at a landscape scale to 604 
provide clear economic and social benefits (Natural England, accessed 24/10/2019) The 25 605 
Year Environment Plan (HM Government 2018), promised a new cross-government 606 
approach to governing the environment based on the notion that environmental protection and 607 
enhancement is crucial to social and economic well-being.  An expert Natural Capital 608 
Committee was established in 2012 and reappointed for a second term in 2016 whose role is 609 
to advise government and oversee the 25 Year Environmental Plan in relation to sustainable 610 
use of natural capital including the benefits the economy and society derive from nature (HM 611 
Government 2016). 612 
 These developments suggest that institutional contexts are not fixed – they can change 613 
significantly over time, although this change may be slow (**AUTHORS**; Peters 2016). 614 
Future research could explore what institutional changes have happened over time, why, and 615 
the impact these have had on uptake of the idea of ESF.   A particular area of focus could be 616 
on any gap between policy steer and what happens on the ground; as this paper has shown, 617 
the inclusion of the ESF in policy documents does not necessarily mean it is being carried out 618 
in practice. For example, the above-mentioned 25-year Environment Plan has been criticised 619 
for being full of good intentions but lacking legally binding targets, underpinning legislation 620 
and specific practical solutions (EAC 2018). Drawing on institutional analysis future research 621 
could posit that such plans might not amount to much in practice in the short term as they will 622 
be heavily dominated by the institutional process they encounter. These could include 623 
inadequate resources or rewards for pursuing the idea of ESF, lack of support from senior 624 
staff, or contradictory messages at ministerial or Cabinet level, among many others. The 625 
dynamics of if/how these change over time could be revealed using the scheme in Table 1 626 
informing both more explanatory research question development and more targeted 627 
approaches by policy actors to overcome such barriers. For example, for Cell 1 a suitable 628 
strategy might be to link the ESF to career progression, spending or budgets. Likewise, the 629 
logics described in Cell 5 might be countered by dedicated training and censure for failing to 630 
adopt the ESF norms. We, therefore, present Table 1 as consolidation of our exploratory 631 
approach so that more deductive analysis can be pursued in other critical environmental 632 
policy initiatives from a local to a global scale, and where appropriate targeted strategies can 633 
be developed to improve implementation on the basis of the analysis. Overall, the resulting 634 
more detailed and integrated accounts would not only provide new academic insights but 635 
could be useful in devising policy strategies for environmental policy that are more sensitive 636 
to institutional environments in which they are expected to perform. 637 
 638 
 639 
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 764 Appendix 1 - Headline questions for interviewees  
1. Who are you and what is your role?  
2. What is your opinion of the ESF? 
3. What do you understand the ESF to be?  
4. How important is the ESF to your sector/organisation/day-to day work responsibilities?  
5. What key factors influence the adoption of the ESF in your organisation/sector/more 
generally?  
6. To what extent has appraisal become an important venue for embedding the ESF in  
decision making?  
7. What are the advantages and disadvantages the government’s current approach to embedding 
the ESF in policy making?  
8. How did you go about including the ESF in your decision making? What helped or hindered you 
in doing so?  
9. How might ESF be better embedded in the decision-making processes of your organisation?   
 
